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Financial Crisis in Asia Region: Its Genesis, Severity and Impact 
on Poverty and Hunger 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
There has been a surge of studies focusing on the recent financial crisis that erupted in USA 
and has rapidly spread to the rest of the world (e.g., IMF, 2008, World Bank, 2008a, ADB, 
2008, Arrow, 2008, Krugman, 2008, Phelps, 2008). Indeed, this crisis has turned into a crisis 
of confidence. Despite extensive interventions by governments and monetary authorities, the 
supply  of  credit  has  shrunk,  stock  markets  have  recorded  dramatic  losses,  and  a  major 
downturn in the global economy has occurred. Commodity prices have eased from recent 
peaks and large exchange rate realignments have occurred (ADB, 2008, 2010, IMF, 2008, 
2010). 
     The  roots  of  this  crisis  lay  in  the  subprime  mortgage  market  in  USA.  Expansionary 
monetary policy kept the interest rate low for some years and encouraged borrowing for real 
estate. Financial institutions offered loans to people who were not capable of repaying them-
the subprime borrowers. Such loans were bundled up and turned into investments through 
securitization. These mortgage securities were also combined with other securities designed 
to reduce the risk such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and used to entice more 
investors. Financial institutions also entered into intricate financial contracts known as credit 
derivatives  or  credit default  swaps  in  order  to  protect  against  default.  An  oversupply  of 
homes and rising interest rates caused a decline in housing prices and home loans. Rising 
defaults, and declining house prices and lending resulted in losses to those institutions that 
held  and  sold  mortgage-backed  securities  and  credit derivatives.  Subsequently,  the  crisis 
spread to non-housing businesses and larger financial institutions not directly connected with 
mortgage  lending.  Many  had  invested  in  assets  derived  from  mortgage-based  securities. 
Interbank lending rates rose to reflect higher risk in the financial sector. As interbank lending 3 
 
contracted  and  trust  eroded,  the  credit  market  failure  unravelled.  Overseas  financial 
institutions linked to these markets were sucked into the financial turmoil of USA, UK and 
the rest of Europe. Investors started withdrawing from stock markets resulting in huge falls in 
valuation. These falls were recorded in both high-income and emerging markets, given trade 
and asset linkages. As the contagion spread, further, predictions of a global recession gained 
plausibility.  
     This  crisis  followed  on  the  heels  of  the  food  price  crisis  that  caused  riots  in  many 
developing  countries  (FAO,  2009).  In  fact,  as  emphasised  by  Rodrik  (2010), developing 
countries have been prone to a series of crises -some financial and others of a different kind- 
with devastating consequences for the poor. He observes “For too many of these countries, 
economic growth in the last two decades relied on a combination of two factors: a natural 
rebound from previous financial crises (as in Latin America) or political conflicts and civil 
war (as in Africa), and high commodity prices. Neither can be relied on for the productive 
transformation that developing countries need” (Rodrik, 2010, no page number).  
     The main objective of the present study is to deepen our understanding of the severity of 
the financial crisis and its implications for growth and poverty reduction in selected Asian 
countries. While our focus is on the recent financial crisis, our analysis yields insights into 
the  channels  through  which  the  effects  of  financial  crisis  on  growth  and  poverty  are 
transmitted in developing countries. In fact, there is a body of empirical literature to assess 
the effects of financial crises on growth and/or poverty, using micro data sets. Most of these 
studies have confirmed negative impacts of crises on growth and poverty reduction (e.g., the 
Latin American Crisis (Oscar, 1998), the Asian Financial Crisis (Nixson and Walters, 1999; 
Mazumdar and Horton, 2000) the Russian Crisis (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000)).
1 But there 
have been few studies to assess the effect of a crisis on growth and poverty or nutrition using 
cross-country data over long periods.  4 
 
     The financial crisis which began unravelling in 2007 is distinct because it originated in the 
crisis of Banking System of the United States, not in developing countries. Its effects were 
severe and worldwide, as it raised the spectre of the Great Depression in the 1930s (IMF, 
2010). To better understand the implication of the recent financial crisis for economic growth 
and poverty, the present study carries out cross-country regression analysis for a sample of 
Asian countries.  
     The scheme is as follows. In the next section, an attempt is made to link finance and the 
real economy, followed by a brief exposition of the dynamics of the financial crisis. Section 
III gives an account of how the crisis unfolded in Asia. Section IV is devoted to a review of 
the literature on finance, growth and poverty. Section V reviews the impact of financial crisis 
on microfinance given the increasingly important role of the latter in reducing poverty in 
Asian countries. In the absence of firm empirical evidence, a distillation of recent surveys of 
MFIs and other evidence is given. The data, model specifications and econometric results are 
discussed in Sections VI and VII, primarily to illustrate how credit influences growth and 
poverty  reduction.  An  extension  throws  new  light  on  various  mechanisms  that  link 
contraction of credit to lowering of crop yields and aggravation of poverty in a sample of 





II.  Finance and Real Economy 
While this linkage remains contentious, various studies have focused on the following. The 
first is through a financial accelerator that amplifies the effects of financial cycles on the real 
economy,  through  its  effects  on  the  value  of  collateral  and  thereby  expansion  of  credit. 
Another is through lenders’ balance sheets and the relationship between bank capital and 
aggregate credit. When bank capital is eroded, banks become reluctant to lend and are forced 5 
 
to deleverage. A third but overlapping with the first linkage is the variation in the role of the 
financial  accelerator  with  the  financial  system  (arm’s  length  financing  as  opposed  to 
relationship banking). In other words, households and producers can substitute away from 
banks to markets (IMF, 2008).  
     The  dynamics  of  the  financial  crisis  could  be  delineated  as  follows:  the  procyclical 
behaviour  of  bank  leverage  –  changes  during  upturns  and  downturns  is  crucial  to 
understanding how banking stress translates into a reduced credit supply, a higher cost of 
capital, and a flattening of economic activity. More specifically, the key issue is: when banks 
overextend their balance sheets during booms, on the back of higher asset values and lower 
perceived risks, financial imbalances build up, economic activity is further boosted that in 
turn also further boosts asset values, reduces perceived risk, fostering further lending and 
economic expansion. Under such conditions, a financial shock that either increases risks or 
reduces yields prompts a cycle of deleveraging, with a sharp reduction in bank lending as 
bank capital falls, leading to an economic slowdown that feeds into a further reduction in 
credit supply. The procyclicality of bank leverage is greater when banks are more exposed to 
fluctuations in the market value of assets-for example, through their holdings of securities 
and their repurchase. IMF (2008) confirms that commercial banks tend to be more procyclical 
when  operating  in  more  arm’s  length  financial  systems,  where  a  greater  share  of 
intermediation occurs through financial markets rather than through traditional relationship-
based (and bank dominated) activities. Thus, more arm’s length financial systems are more 
prone  to  financial  crises.  In  fact,  lack  of  information  about  the  value  and  risk  of  many 
securitised  products,  and  about  the  losses  subsequently  associated  with  these  products, 
amplified the present crisis. 
     The  channels  through  which  the  financial  crisis  impacted  on  growth  and  poverty  in 
developing countries are diverse (Lin and Martin, 2010). These include changes in capital 6 
 
flows, commodity prices, remittances, interest rates, risk premia, and trade opportunities. The 
channels through which rural poor were impacted are even more complex, with linkages 
involving commodity prices, wage rates and employment likely to be particularly important.  
     To  elaborate  selectively,  the  effects  of  changes  in  commodity  prices  are  complex. 
Declines in the prices of staple foods typically reduce poverty in developing countries, as the 
poor spend  a  large  share of their incomes on  these foods, and  many  poor  in rural areas 
including small farmers are net buyers of these foods (Ivanic and Martin, 2008). Declines in 
the prices of some higher income-elastic foods such as dairy products, however, increase 
poverty by lowering the incomes of small producers who produce and sell these commodities 
but are unable to afford them. Declines in the prices of cash crops (e.g. cotton, coffee, rubber) 
are, however,  more likely to increase poverty  as  farmers  in  developing countries  are  net 
sellers of these goods and the poor spend only small shares of their incomes on them. 
     A  related  observation  is  that  income  reductions  increase  not  just  poverty  but  also 
nutritional  deprivation.  Through  a  lower  demand  for  calories,  proteins  and  fats,  and 
consequently lower intake, productivity is lowered and employment in rural labour markets is 
hampered.  Thus  nutrition-poverty  traps  emerge  (Dasgupta  and  Ray,  1986,  and  Jha  et  al. 
2009). Evidence also suggests that large sections of rural poor are also more vulnerable to 
shocks and crises than the non-poor, and shocks propel them into long spells of poverty 
(Gaiha and Imai, 2009, Dercon and Christiansen, 2010). Finally, as the poor are more credit-
constrained,  contraction  of MFIs’  loan  portfolio  and more  stringent  selection  criteria  are 
likely to hurt the poor more.
2 
 
III.  Financial Crisis in Asia   
How did the Crisis Unfold in Asia? 7 
 
The  crisis  manifested  in  emerging  Asia  in  early  2008,  and  was  expected  to  worsen  in 
response to slackening demand from advanced economies and growing tensions in regional 
financial  markets.  More  recent  assessments,  however,  point  to  a  strong  recovery  led  by 
China,  India and other emerging Asian economies (ADB, 2010, IMF, 2010). A selective 
review of the evidence is given below. 
     Growth in China eased to 10
1/2 per cent in the first half of 2008, from 12 per cent in 2007, 
partly because of slowing exports. Investment and consumption, however, maintained their 
momentum. On the other hand, in India, growth in the second quarter slowed to 8 per cent, on 
the back of weakening investment, while private consumption and exports held up better than 
feared, with signs of the latter registering a sharp drop in October, 2008.
3 In fact, exports fell 
sharply in other Asian countries too, including South Korea, China, Japan and Taiwan.
4 In the 
so-called NIEs and ASEAN economies, activity decelerated. Domestic demand softened as a 
result of surge in food and fuel prices, and investment plans were scaled down. Vietnam, for 
example, underwent a sharp correction as the demand boom caused by large capital inflows 
eroded.  
     Financial markets weakened due to a pessimistic global outlook and investor risk appetite 
declined following the September turbulence. Equity markets that had a bull run during 2005-
07-prices, for instance, more than quadrupling in China and tripling in India- plummeted. In 
some countries, borrowing spreads shot up for banks relying on wholesale funding. 
     Current  accounts  began  to  show  strains  as  well,  largely due to  rising  import bills  for 
commodities  and  slowing  export  growth,  while  capital  account  and  exchange  rate 
developments  varied.    Capital  inflows  to  China  remained  strong,  as  reflected  in  the 
continuing surge of foreign reserves; capital flows to other countries in the region became 
more  volatile,  particularly  to  those  running  large  external  deficits.  Consequently,  their 
currencies came under pressure, prompting central banks to intervene (e.g. India, Pakistan 8 
 
and  Vietnam).  While  the  Chinese  renmimbi  and  the  ASEAN  currencies  appreciated,  the 
South Asian and NIE’s currencies weakened. 
          Headline CPI inflation soared in many countries in the first half of 2008, with slight 
reductions in a few. In China, headline CPI inflation declined from its peak of 8
1/2 per cent in 




Contrary  to  apprehensions,  domestic  –demand  driven  economies  of  China,  India  and 
Indonesia  led  to  a  slow  but  faltering  global  economic  recovery.  Indeed,  the  short-term 
outlook for Asia remains positive, with growth expected to settle at more sustainable but still 
high levels. Ample global liquidity, on the one hand, and the relatively robust growth and low 
public  debt  in  Asia,  on  the  other  hand,  are  likely  to  fuel  capital  flows  to  this  region. 
Reflecting the slowing of export growth and strong domestic demand, Asia’s current account 
surplus is expected to fall to 3 per cent of the regional GDP in 2010 and 2011, from about 5 
per cent in 2007, making a modest contribution to reduction of global imbalances.  
     With external demand from advanced economies unlikely to return to pre-crisis levels in 
the near future, Asia will need stronger domestic demand to maintain robust growth. The 
normalisation  of  policy  measures  in  Asia,  therefore,  must  be  accompanied by  continued 
measures to reinforce private domestic consumption and investment (IMF, 2010). 
      
IV.  Review of Cross-Country Studies on Finance, Growth and Poverty 
There is a vast literature on this theme with valuable insights from cross-country data over 
time. We will concentrate largely on two (Beck et al. 2007, and Claessens and  Feijen 2006), 
with brief comments on a few other important contributions. Beck et al. (2007) examine the 9 
 
effects of financial development on poverty through two channels: aggregate growth, and 
changes in the distribution of income. Instead of examining the finance-growth link, they 
offer an assessment of the impact of financial development on changes in the distribution of 
income  and  changes  in  both  relative  and  absolute  poverty.  Specifically,  the  variables 
considered are (i) the Gini coefficient of income distribution; (ii) income share of the poor, 
measured as the income share of the poorest quintile relative to total national income; and 
(iii) the share of the population living on less than $1 per day.  Using GMM panel estimator 
for dynamic models, greater financial development is associated with poverty reduction. In 
fact, 60 per cent of the impact of financial development on the poorest quintile works through 
aggregate growth and 40 per cent through reduction in income inequality
5.  
     Claessens  and  Feijen  (2006)  identify  specific  channels  through  which  financial 
development impacts on undernourishment
6. Using data from 1980-2003 and relying on IV 
estimation  for  robustness,  they  show  that  private  credit  has  a  large  negative  effect  on 
undernourishment through higher agricultural productivity in general and higher livestock, 
crop and cereal yields in particular. To a large extent higher agricultural productivity due to 
financial  development  is  mediated  by  greater  fertilizer  and  tractor  use.  Besides,  the 
distribution of banking outlets makes a difference.   
 
V.  Impact of Financial Crisis on Microfinance 
Microfinance allows poor people to protect, diversify and increase sources of their income. 
Microfinance also mitigates vulnerability to extreme fluctuations that are a feature of their 
daily existence. Loans, savings, and insurance smooth out income fluctuations and stabilize 
consumption levels even during lean periods (Littlefield et al. 2003). 
     There is little hard evidence on the impact of the current financial turmoil on microfinance. 
To the extent that there is contraction of credit, and the concomitant reduction in rural credit, 10 
 
the implications for the rural poor are likely to be serious. Even though interest rates have 
fallen to stimulate demand for credit, there is a strong reluctance to lend in an environment 
lacking trust. So, effectively, contraction of credit implies higher interest rates and shorter 
maturities. If these observations have general validity, it follows that the demand for credit 
would be reduced especially in the target groups of MFIs, and poverty may increase through 
financial  constraints  on  raising  agricultural  productivity.  Vulnerability  of  low  income 
households may also get aggravated because of their failure to smooth consumption. On the 
other hand, the loan portfolio of MFIs may shift in favour of wealthier clients. Moreover, the 
financial viability may erode because of moral hazard and adverse selection. A major priority 
therefore  is  to  inject  more  capital  into  the  financial  system-especially  MFIs.  That  these 
concerns have emerged as major priorities is reflected in a recent survey conducted by the 
Microcredit  Summit  Campaign,  reported  in  Micro-credit Summit  e-news,  vol. 6,  issue  2: 
October, 2008). A summary of the responses to the questions asked is given below.  
     The concerns stem from a tightening money market, higher cost of funds, and drying up of 
foreign funds. Higher rates of interest are resulting in repayment difficulties and reduction in 
borrowing. Consumption of food is reduced in the event incomes cannot be supplemented. 
MFIs are being forced to be more cost-effective or else are likely to be wiped out. What is 
indeed most worrying is the pessimism of investors in microfinance. Few, if any, concrete 
strategies are identified to deal with the financial turmoil.  
     A  more  recent  survey  (CSFI,  2009),  based  on  430  respondents  from  82  countries, 
including observers,  regulators,  investors and practitioners,  throws new  light  on  many  of 
these issues. Going by the aggregate of responses, the concerns about credit risk and too little 
funding moved centre-stage. The fact that much funding is in non-local currency has added to 
foreign currency risk owing to volatility in the foreign exchange markets. All these risks 
taken together are reflected in more serious concerns about erosion of profitability. “Many 11 
 
respondents saw a vicious circle here: the recession creating a worse business environment, 
leading to mounting delinquencies and shrinking markets, leading to declining profitability, 
loss of investor confidence, and cutbacks in funding , and so on” (CSFI, 2009, p.7). 
     Associated  with  the  vulnerability  of  MFIs  is  the  larger  risk  of  mission  drift  and 
abandonment of their social objectives. There was a mixed response to how well prepared 
were the MFIs to handle these risks. Barely 5 per cent of the respondents acknowledged that 
they were well prepared and 13 per cent confessed that they were ill-prepared. The rest gave 
a mixed response. Among the Asian respondents, however, the concerns about these risks 
were  more  muted:  liquidity  and  credit  risks  figured  in  their  top  ten,  but  not  in  the 
concentrated form of other regional respondents. There were also concerns about mission 
drift and political interference.  
    In  sum,  even  though  perceptions  delineated  here  may  well  be  more  negative  than 
warranted by the ground reality, it would be a mistake to set them aside completely. 
     Supplementary  evidence  comes  from  simulations  in  Imai  et  al  (2010b).  The  results 
simulate the effects of hypothetical reductions in gross loan portfolio (GLP) of MFIs, GDP 
per capita and share of domestic credit in GDP on the head-count index of poverty. Although 
the overall rise in poverty is low (about 3.45 per cent in the mild recession scenario), it is by 
no means negligible. It must be emphasised, however, that the cumulative effect of the global 
slowdown reflected in sluggishness of investment on poverty may well be larger. 
  
VI.  Data and Models for Finance, Growth and Hunger in Asia 
Here the objective  is to analyse the relationships between finance, growth and hunger  in 
selected Asian countries. The analysis is based on a panel of 9 countries over the period 1960 
to 2006, based on a dynamic panel estimation strategy that builds upon the recent literature 
reviewed  above.  First,  a  description  of  the  data  used  is  given.  This  is  followed  by  an 12 
 
exposition  of  the  models  estimated.  In  a  subsequent  section,  the  results  are  discussed, 
followed by some concluding observations from a broad policy perspective. 
         
Data 
All the models are estimated with the finance, poverty and inequality data at the country level. 
The data sets created are based on World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) 2008 (World 
Bank, 2008b), FAO-STAT (FAO, 2008), World Bank’s Finance Data (based on Beck et al. 
(2000), The UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) (UNU-WIDER, 2008), 
and Barro-Lee’s (2000) data on education.  
     One of the data constraints in addressing our research questions is that while annual data 
on most of the key economic and financial variables are available for 9 countries (except 
Vietnam for which most of the variables start from 1985-1990) in 1960-2006, the data on 
inequality  and  poverty  are  available  only  for  few  years,  when  a  national  income  or 
expenditure survey or a census were carried out. Hence we use annual panel data for 8 or 9 
countries to examine the links between financial growth and economic or agricultural growth 
in the period 1960-2006, with a few missing observations. We have specified a dynamic 
panel data model, drawing upon Blundell and Bond (1998) - an extension of Arellano and 
Bond (1991). To investigate the relationship between finance and inequality or poverty, we 
use the panel data aggregated at 5- year intervals since 1960 (along the lines of Barro and Lee 
(2000) or the empirical macroeconomics literature to test growth theories). For all countries 
except Vietnam, inequality data from UNU-WIDER’s WIID and undernutrition data from 
WDI (Classens and Feijen, 2006) are available roughly once or sometimes twice in 5 year 
periods. If more than one estimate is available in one period, the average is used
7. These 
poverty and inequality data are matched with the 5- year averages of finance and economic 
variables. One of the advantages of applying two different time schedules is that we can use 13 
 
the predicted values of finance data based on annual panel data for the 5 year-panel, whereby 
inequality  or  undernourishment  is  estimated  by  the  aggregated  finance  data  based  on 
predictions on an annual basis. This approach would at least partially address the issue of 
endogeneity of finance in the inequality or undernourishment equation. 
     Appendix 1 summarises the definitions of variables, descriptive statistics and data sources. 
We take three different measures of finance-(i) logarithm of the share of private credit in 
GDP; (ii) log of the share of private credit through (formal) money deposit banks as a share 
of GDP (the narrow definition of private credit), and (iii) log of Financial System Deposits in 
GDP. For inequality, we use the income Gini coefficient. Poverty is treated as synonymous 
with the prevalence of undernourishment, as in Classens and Feijen (2006). Other variables 
used in the analysis are defined in the appendix. 
  
Model Specifications 
We estimate four dynamic models in which the dependent variable, (a) GDP per capita or 
agricultural value added per capita, (b) finance, (c) inequality or (d) undernourishment is 
separately estimated. A variable on finance is used as one of the explanatory variables for (a), 
(c) and (d).  
(a)  Model for GDP or Agricultural Value Added  
Following Guariglia and Poncet (2008), we specify the following relation:  
                               (1) 
where i and t denote  country and  year, respectively;  it Y ∆  is GDP  per  capita growth and 
Finance it is a proxy variable for finance, Control it is a vector of control variables,   is the 
country specific unobservable effect (e.g. social and cultural factors),   is the time effect and 
 is an error term, independent, and identically distributed (or i.i.d.).  The log of lagged per 
capita GDP  is included in Control it to control for convergence. Other controls include log of 14 
 
share of population with more than primary education, log of government expenditure in 
GDP (to measure size of government), log of CPI (Consumer Price Index), and log of trade as 
a share of GDP (measure of openness). In a variant, the dependent variable is agricultural 
value added per capita.   
     A version of equation (1) can be written as 
 
with the log of lagged per capita GDP on the right hand side and the rest of the explanatory 
variables  as  a  vector,    .    Estimating  (1)  (with  log  of  lagged  per  capita  GDP)  is  thus 
equivalent to estimating the following standard dynamic panel data model:  
           (2)  
GMM panel estimator relies on first-differencing the estimating equation (and thus country 
fixed  effects  will  be  eliminated)  and  appropriate  lags  of  the  right  side  variables  as 
instruments.  
      (3)
8 
Two issues have to be resolved: one is endogeneity of the regressors and the second is the 
correlation  between   and   (e.g.  see  Baltagi,  2005,  Chapter  8). 
Assuming  that  it ε is  not  serially  correlated  and  that  the  regressors  in  Xit  are  weakly 
exogenous,  the  generalized  method-of-moments  (GMM)  first  difference  estimator  (e.g. 
Arellano and Bond, 1991) can be used.  Alternatively, we could use the lagged differences of 
all explanatory variables as instruments for the level equation and combine the difference 
equation  (3)  and  the  level  equation  (2)  in  a  system  whereby  the  panel  estimators  use 
instrument  variables  based  on  previous  realisations  of  the  explanatory  variables  as  the 
internal  instruments,  using  the  Blundell-Bond  (1998)  system  GMM  estimator  based  on 
additional moment conditions
9. Such a system gives consistent results under the assumptions 
that there is no second order serial correlation and the instruments are uncorrelated with the 15 
 
error terms. Validity of instruments is tested by Sargan’s J test and the second order serial 
correlation of the residuals. The Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM estimator is used in the 
present  study.  We  use  the  heteroscedasticity-robust  variance-covariance  estimator  for  all 
cases.   
     The Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM estimator is useful to address the problem of 
potentially  endogenous  regressors  (e.g.  Finance  in  equation  (1)).  In  the  system  equation, 
endogenous variables can  be treated  similarly  to lagged  dependent variables. The second 
lagged  levels  of  endogenous  variables  could  be  specified  as  instruments  for  difference 
equation. The first lagged differences of those variables could also be used as instruments for 
the level equation in the system.   
     We try the cases (i) where the endogeneity is not taken into account, and (ii) where some 
endogenous  variables  (after  instrumenting)  are  included.  In  this  model,  we  try  the  cases 
where finance and trade share are treated as endogenous variables.  
(b)  Model for Financial Development 
While there is a huge empirical literature on the determinants of finance, we use a simple 
specification, following Baltagi et al.’s (2009) where finance is estimated by a dynamic panel 
model in which trade openness and financial openness are used as explanatory variables.  
       (4) 
This is estimated by the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator.  
 
(c)  Model for Inequality 
Likewise, inequality is estimated by a dynamic panel model using the Blundell-Bond system 
GMM estimator applied to 5- year panel data.   
            (5) 16 
 
The dependent variable is the Gini index of income.   is log of private credit (value 
of  credit  by  financial  intermediaries  to  the  private  sector)  divided  by  GDP,    or  log  of 
Financial System Deposits in GDP.   , a vector of control variables including log of initial 
years of schooling, log of growth rate of the GDP deflator, and log of trade share. Finance 
and trade share are treated as endogenous variables in some specifications.  
(d)  Model for Undernourishment 
In the regression of prevalence of undernourishment, we use the same specification as for the 
inequality  equation  except  that  we include  log of population  growth  and log of share of 
working age population (that is, share of the age group between 15-65, or active population in 
the total population) in  .  
 
VII.  Econometric Results 
The results of the models specified above are discussed here. Table 1 reports 6 cases; Cases 1 
and 2 for the broad definition of private credit, Cases 3 and 4 for the narrow definition of 
private credit through banks, and Cases 5 and 6 for financial system deposits. Cases 2, 4, and 
6 are those in which finance and trade openness are treated as endogenous in the system. 
These six cases (based on three definitions of finance and whether some of the explanatory 
variables are endogenized in the system) will be tried for all the other models.   
(Table 1 to be inserted around here) 
 
     Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient estimate of finance is negative and significant in 
Case 1, which is contradictory to the predictions of positive role of financial development on 
economic  growth  (e.g.,  through  financial  intermediation  or  facilitation  of  industrial  or 
agricultural investment). However, it ceases to be significant once it is endogenized in the 17 
 
system. Finance, defined as financial system deposits, is, however, positive and significant in 
Cases 5 and 6.  
     As a sensitivity test, we have run the regression with the same specification by dropping 
Malaysia
10. As shown in the last panel, in Case 2 where finance is treated as an endogenous 
variable, it has  a significant positive coefficient (at  the 10%  level),  while the  coefficient 
estimate in Case 1 ceases to be significant. The coefficient estimates are not significant in 
Case 3 or Case 4. However, they  are highly significant in Case 5 and Case 6, as in the 
corresponding case with Malaysia. Incidentally, in Case 6, finance has a significant positive 
coefficient with a much higher z value. The rest of the coefficient estimates are more or less 
the same in the cases without Malaysia and are, therefore, not shown here.  
     Education, defined as the share of the population with primary education or above, is 
positively associated with GDP per capita. Also, size of government measured by share of 
government spending of GDP leads to higher GDP per capita. The coefficient estimate of CPI 
is positive in all cases except Case 1. Trade share is positive and significant regardless of 
whether it is endogenized in the system. Tests for the second order serial correlation of the 
residuals (m2) show that there is no second order serial correlation except in Case 1. The 
results for the Sargan test validate our specification as over-identifying restrictions are valid 
for all the cases.    
     In Table 2, we estimate the determinants of agricultural value added per capita using the 
same specification. Private credit is negative and significant at the 5% level in Case 2 and at 
the 10% level in Case 1. However, the coefficient estimate of financial system deposit is 
positive and highly significant in Cases 5 and 6.  
(Table 2 to be inserted around here) 
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     We have carried out again a sensitivity test without Malaysia. The coefficient estimates of 
finance are still negative in Case 1 to Case 4, but they are no longer significant in any of these 
cases, which suggests that Malaysia seems to have driven the negative and significant (at the 
10% level) coefficients  in Cases 1, 2 and 4. Cases 5 and 6 with Malaysia still show a positive 
and significant coefficient for finance. Thus the evidence on the role of finance in agricultural 
growth is mixed.  
     Table 3 contains the results of the finance equation. Cases 1 and 2, and Cases 3 and 4, and 
Cases  5  and  6  relate  to  three  different  finance  measures.  Two  cases  are  tried  for  each 
definition according to whether trade openness is treated as an endogenous variable or not. 
Higher GDP per capita is significantly associated with financial development (at the 10% 
level) in all cases except Case 2. This is consistent with Baltagi et al. (2009). However, trade 
openness is not significant in any of the six cases.  
(Table 3 to be inserted around here) 
 
     This  is in sharp contrast to Baltagi et al. (2009) who found a positive and significant 
coefficient estimate for both trade openness and financial openness. It is noted, however, that 
they use data for 31 countries including advanced countries (e.g. US, UK, Japan), middle 
income countries (e.g. Brazil) and low income countries (e.g. Zimbabwe) for 1980-1996. The 
use of different data sets would partly explain the differences between the results. The Sargan 
tests and tests for serial correlations validate our specification.     
     Tables  4  and  5  report  the  results  based  on  a  dynamic  panel  data  model  where  the 
dependent variables are the Gini coefficient and the prevalence of undernourishment. Based 
on the regression results in Cases 2, 4 and 6 in Table 4, the predicted values of three finance 
indicators are derived for the entire period on an annual basis. These predicted values are 
aggregated at 5-year intervals and are used as alternatives to the actual values. The merit of 19 
 
this  approach  is  that  it  addresses  partially  the  endogeneity  problem  of  finance.  It  also 
increases the  number of observations by making out-of-sample forecast if there are some 
missing observations. 12 cases are tried. Cases 1, 3, ..., 11 (odd numbers) are the cases where 
endogeneity is not taken into account, while Cases 2, 4, ..., 12 (even  numbers) are those 
where the endogeneity of potentially endogenous variables (e.g. trade openness) is considered. 
Cases 1 to 4, Cases 5 to 8 and Cases 9 to 12 are for three different measures of finance, broad 
and  narrow  definitions  of  private  credit  and  financial  system  deposit  (each  of  which  is 
relative to GDP). Cases 3 and 4, Cases 7 and 8 and Cases 11 and 12 are based on predicted 
finance measures. Only key results are summarized below.  
(Tables 4 and 5 to be inserted around here) 
 
     In Table 4, the Gini coefficient is the dependent variable in all the cases. A main finding is 
that  the  financial  development  measured  by  higher  levels  of  deposits  is  significantly 
associated  with  lower  inequality  as  implied  by  highly  significant  (at  the  1%  level)  and 
negative coefficient estimates of finance in Cases 9 to 12. It is noted that the coefficient 
estimate is lower in absolute terms when the endogeneity is taken into consideration. Signs of 
coefficient estimates for finance are negative for the other two definitions of finance in Cases 
1 to 8 (and significant at the 10% level in Case 1 and Case 7, and non-significant in the rest).  
     In  sum,  finance  tends  to  decrease  inequality  measured  by  the  Gini  coefficient.  The 
coefficient estimates for schooling years in the initial year are negative and significant. If the 
country  has  higher  levels  of  education  in  the  early  period,  it  tends  to  have  higher  Gini 
because only a section of the educated people captures the benefits. Trade openness is not 
significant, nor is the GDP deflator. The Sargan tests and tests for serial correlations, which 
imply that there is no second order serial correlation, validate our specification in all the cases.      20 
 
     Table 5 focuses on the determinants of undernourishment. A few additional explanatory 
variables are included for these cases. A main finding is that private credit broadly defined 
has a significant negative effect on  undernourishment (at the 1% level) in Cases 1 to 4, i.e., 
depending  on  whether  the  endogeneity  of  finance  is  taken  into  account,  or  whether  the 
predicted or the actual values of private credit are used. Subject to these caveats, this suggests 
that private credit, broadly defined to cover formal and informal banking sectors, plays an 
important role in reducing hunger. The negative and significant  coefficient estimates (at the 
10% level)  of narrowly defined private  credit (formal banking)  in  Cases  5  and 7 further 
strengthen  the  poverty  or  undernourishment  reducing  roles  of  finance.  However,  some 
caution is necessary as these coefficients cease to be significant once they are endogenized in 
Cases 6 and 8. Financial system deposit is not significant in Cases 8 to 12.  
     On the results of control variables, trade openness is  not significant, while population 
growth is positive and significant in increasing the prevalence of undernourishment, as in 
Cases  5  to  11.  As  working  age  ratio  (i.e.,  share  of  people  in  the  working  age  –group) 
increases, the prevalence of undernourishment tends to decrease. The Sargan tests and tests 
for serial correlations validate our specification.  
     In sum, there is support for the view that contraction of credit has adverse effects on the 
proportion of undernourished. This is broadly consistent with the past empirical literature to 
identify the negative impact of the financial crisis on poverty using micro data (e.g.  Oscar, 
1998; Nixson and Walters, 1999; Mazumdar and Horton, 2000; Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000). 
However, the present study is important as this is one of the first few attempts to examine the 
link between credit contraction and poverty or undernourishment from a macro perspective 
using the cross-country data. There are also likely to be indirect effects of GDP and 
agricultural growth deceleration due to credit contraction consistent with, for example,  Imai, 
et al. (2010c). However, as in some cases, the causality runs both ways between GDP and 21 
 
finance, disentangling of the direct and indirect effects of finance on undernutrition is not 
straightforward. 
 
VIII.  Concluding Observations   
Building  on  the  recent  literature  on  finance,  growth  and  hunger,  we  have  examined  the 
experience of 9 Asian countries over the period 1960-2006 by dynamic panel data models. 
Although the results are mixed, depending on the specification and variables used, there is 
some evidence favouring a positive role of finance on growth of GDP and agricultural value 
added. But there is also evidence of a reverse causality between GDP growth and financial 
development. In fact, there are a few cases in which the causality runs both ways. In light of 
this complexity, the results of finance on inequality and hunger require cautious interpretation. 
Financial development reduces the Gini coefficient of income distribution. Although there is 
support for the view that financial development reduces hunger, the results are not so robust. 
Specifically, when the endogeneity of trade and finance is taken into account, the negative 
effect of financial development on hunger disappears. Whether these results are driven by 
some outliers or by a complex two-way dynamics between finance and growth needs further 
examination.  
     While microfinance has the potential to ameliorate some of the worst forms of deprivation, 
the contraction of credit in general and risk aversion of investors, together with a looming 
global recession, underlie gloomy prospects for the poor in this region.  
     In conclusion, finance, growth and hunger are linked in complex ways. Our conclusion, 
therefore, of credit contraction and deceleration of growth aggravating hunger is plausible but 





1.  However, using panel data, Stillman and Thomas (2008) found a weak impact of the Russian 
crisis on nutritional status. 
2.  For  assessment  of  poverty  alleviation  role  of  microfinance  from  micro  and  macro 
perspectives, see Imai et al. (2010 a) and Imai et al. (2010b). 
3.  Growth rate of merchandise exports plummeted from 28.9 per cent in 2007 to 13.7 per cent in 
2008 (ADB, 2010). 
4.  Financial Times (11 November, 2008) cites evidence of precipitous falls in exports in these 
countries.  China,  for  example,  reported  the  slowest  export  growth  in  four  months.  South 
Korea’s exports in the first 10 days of November fell 26 per cent from the same period a year 
earlier. A slowing of the Chinese economy also had a knock-on effect on Taiwan. An exporter 
of electronic goods, its overall exports fell 8.3 per cent from a year ago. Sales to China and 
Hong Kong fell about 20 per cent. For an updated account confirming a sharp drop in exports 
in these countries, see ADB (2010). 
5.  Honohan (2003) shows that a 10 per cent increase in private credit to GDP reduces poverty by 
2.5-3 per cent. 
6.  Undernourishment is defined as “the condition of people whose dietary energy consumption 
is continuously below a minimum dietary energy requirement for maintaining a healthy life 
and carrying out a light physical activity”, (FAOSTAT, 2006). 
7.  There are a few cases where there are no inequality or undernutrition data in a 5-year interval. 
Because the missing observations would seriously limit the dynamic panel estimation where 
the lagged dependent variable is used as one of the explanatory variables, we fill these by 
taking the weighted average of the observations in the pre and post periods. We did not have 
any cases where missing observations repeat for 2 periods.     
8.  As an extension,  we  have  implemented  the  case with  the  first  and  second  lagged 
dependent variables in some cases, depending on the results of serial correlation tests 
and significance of coefficient estimates of the lagged dependent variables.  23 
 
9.  See the application by Guariglia and Poncet (2008) to examine the relation between finance 
and economic growth in China. 
10. We do so because Malaysia is a special case not simply because of its size but also because of 
its structural characteristics (e.g. small size, and low share of agriculture in GDP). 
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Table 1 Results for the Growth Equation (GDP per capita) based on Blundell and Bond 
(1998) GMM estimation (Dependent Variable: log GDP per capita) 
    Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6 
    Without   With   Without   With   Without   With  
  Whether  endogenous  Endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  Endogenous  Endogenous 
  Endogenous   regressors  Regressors  regressors  regressors  Regressors  Regressors 
               
Dep. Variable    log(GDP pc)  log(GDP pc)  log(GDP pc)  log(GDP pc)  log(GDP pc)  log(GDP pc) 
Explanatory 
Variables               
L.    1.238  1.287  1.289  1.308  1.254  1.275 
    (23.55)**  (18.48)**  (19.01)**  (18.19)**  (17.75)**  (15.75)** 
L2.    -0.266  -0.311  -0.312  -0.327  -0.279  -0.294 
    (4.59)**  (4.32)**  (4.46)**  (4.45)**  (3.81)**  (3.66)** 
log(private 
credit/GDP)  Endogenous  -0.005  -0.003         
 
(Cases 2, 4 
& 6)  (2.32)*  (1.20)         
log(private credit by   Endogenous      -0.006  -0.002     
banks/GDP) 
(Cases 2, 4 
& 6)      (1.35)  (0.29)     
log(financial system  Endogenous          0.003  0.002 
deposit/GDP) 
(Cases 2, 4 
& 6)          (5.18)**  (2.81)** 
log(share of 
population  Exogenous  0.018  0.008  0.026  0.014  0.022  0.01 
with primary ed. or 
above    (1.30)  (1.12)  (2.07)*  (2.92)**  (1.85)  (1.96) 
log(government   Exogenous  0.019  0.011  0.012  0.003  0.007  0.002 
expenditure/GDP)    (4.18)**  (4.36)**  (2.28)*  (1.34)  (2.50)*  (1.32) 
log(CPI)  Exogenous  -0.005  -0.001  0.001  0.004  0.002  0.004 
    (1.56)  (0.43)  (0.58)  (3.46)**  (1.06)  (2.20)* 
log(Export+Import 
/GDP)  Endogenous  0.029  0.024  0.019  0.014  0.015  0.013 
    (4.24)**  (3.27)**  (3.36)**  (3.03)**  (3.43)**  (2.38)* 
Constant    -0.23  -0.066  -0.202  0.017  -0.052  0.064 
      (3.02)**  (1.49)  (1.34)  (0.28)  (0.67)  (3.75)** 
Observations    294  294  258  258  270  270 
Number of Country     8  8  7  7  7  7 
Arellano-Bond Test for Serial Correlation (Z value)         
m 2    (-2.10)*  (-2.01)*  (-1.39)  (-1.35)  (-1.44)  (-1.39) 
Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions           
Ho: overidentifying restrictions are valid           
    chi
2(323)=   chi
2(459)=   chi
2(288)=   chi
2(423)=   chi
2(300)=   chi
2(435)=  
    345.15  496.1  313.18  429.93  323.97  444.1 
Prpb>Chi2     0.19  0.11  0.14  0.4  0.16  0.37 
1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% (based on robust estimators) 
3. Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM one-step estimator is applied for all the cases. 
Without Malaysia                
log(private 
credit/GDP)  Endogenous  -0.004  0.003         
    (0.93)  (1.79)         
log(private credit by   Endogenous      -0.001  0.003     
banks/GDP)        (0.23)  (0.59)     
log(financial system  Endogenous          0.003  0.003 







Table 2 Results for the Growth Equation (Agricultural Value Added per capita) based 
on Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimation (Dependent Variable: log (Agricultural 
value added per capita)) 
    Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6 
  Whether  Without   With   Without   With   Without   With  
  endogenous  Endogenous  Endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  Endogenous  endogenous 
    Regressors  Regressors  regressors  regressors  Regressors  regressors 
               













Explanatory Variables               
L.    0.72  0.732  0.719  0.736  0.659  0.688 
    (8.23)**  (8.81)**  (9.96)**  (10.91)**  (7.67)**  (8.07)** 
L2.    0.244  0.248  0.255  0.25  0.29  0.288 
    (3.80)**  (3.42)**  (4.27)**  (4.07)**  (3.89)**  (3.53)** 
log(private credit/GDP)  Endogenous  -0.017  -0.016         
 
(Cases 2, 4 
& 6)  (1.81)  (2.00)*         
log(private credit by   Endogenous      -0.013  -0.011     
Banks /GDP) 
(Cases 2, 4 
& 6)      (1.43)  (1.72)     
log(financial system  Endogenous          0.006  0.003 
deposit/GDP)            (4.57)**  (2.46)* 
log(share of population  Exogenous  0.00  0.002  0.006  0.012  0.013  0.012 
with primary ed. or 
above    (0.02)  (0.27)  (1.04)  (3.04)**  (2.81)**  (2.76)** 
log(government   Exogenous  0.007  0.005  -0.002  -0.005  -0.009  -0.008 
expenditure/GDP)    (1.28)  (1.78)  (0.62)  (2.64)**  (1.79)  (2.73)** 
log(CPI)  Exogenous  -0.001  0.00  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.004 
    (0.24)  (0.06)  (1.85)  (3.26)**  (2.79)**  (2.42)* 
log(Export+Import/GDP)  Endogenous  0.025  0.02  0.00  0.002  -0.008  -0.002 
    (3.22)**  (3.39)**  (0.00)  (0.31)  (1.12)  (0.37) 
Constant    0.122  0.053  0.132  0.115  0.41  0.271 
      (0.71)  (0.59)  (1.10)  (1.84)  (7.19)**  (4.99)** 
Observations    284  284  248  248  260  260 
Number of Country     8  8  7  7  7  7 
Arellano-Bond Tes for Serial Correlation (Z value)         
m 2    (-1.58)  (-1.53)  (-1.00)  (-0.93)  (-1.42)  (-1.35) 
Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions           
Ho: overidentifying restrictions are valid           
    chi
2(314)=   chi
2(449)=   chi
2(278)=   chi
2(409)=   chi
2(290)=   chi
2(421)=  
    345.15  496.1  313.18  429.93  323.97  444.1 
Prpb>Chi2     0.19  0.11  0.14  0.4  0.16  0.37 
1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% (based on robust estimators) 
3. Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM one-step estimator is applied for all the cases. 
Without Malaysia                
log(private credit/GDP)  Endogenous  -0.004  -0.005         
    (1.00)  (1.35)         
log(private credit by   Endogenous      0.001  -0.004     29 
 
banks/GDP)        (0.24)  (1.26)     
log(financial system  Endogenous          0.004  0.004 





Table 3 Results for the Finance Equation based on Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM 
estimation (Dependent Variable: Finance) 
    Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6 
  Whether  Without   With   Without   With   Without   With  







  or exogenous   regressors  regressors  regressors  Regressors  Regressors  regressors 
               






credit by  
log(private 





            banks/GDP)  Banks/GDP)  deposit/GDP)  deposit/GDP) 
Explanatory Variables               
L.    1.096  1.114  1.502  1.498  1.017  0.999 
    (14.33)**  (14.04)**  (24.03)**  (24.56)**  (44.82)**  (34.64)** 
L2.    -0.189  -0.184  -0.571  -0.559  -0.092  -0.077 
    (2.51)*  (2.56)*  (8.11)**  (8.11)**  (3.87)**  (2.50)* 
log(GDP per capita) 
Endogenou
s  0.039  0.009  0.064  0.041  0.071  0.04 
 
(Cases 2, 4, 




s  0.025  0.028  -0.008  0.001  0.009  -0.011 
 
(Cases 3, 4, 
& 6)  (0.86)  (1.37)  (0.29)  (0.07)  (0.18)  (0.28) 
Constant    0.123  0.238  -0.489  -0.324  -0.505  -0.316 
    (0.88)  (2.08)*  (3.09)**  (2.91)**  (1.88)  (2.64)** 
Observations    319  319  259  259  271  271 
Number of Country     9  9  8  8  8  8 
Arellano-Bond Tes for Serial Correlation (Z, Probb>z)         
m 2    (-0.53)  (-0.58)  (-2.04)*  (-2.04)*  (-0.95)  (-1.12) 
Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions           
Ho: overidentifying restrictions are valid           
    chi
2(347)=   chi
2(441)=   chi
2(291)=   chi





    383.16  470.4  333.31*  419.25  356.62*  456.33* 
Prpb>Chi2    0.09  0.16  0.04  0.09  0.02  0.02 
1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% (based on robust estimators) 
3. Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM one-step estimator is applied for all the cases. 30 
 
Table 4 Results for the Inequality Equation based on Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimation (Dependent variable: Gini Coefficient) 
                                        
  Whether  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6  Case 7  Case 8  Case 9  Case 10  Case 11  Case 12 
  endogenous  Without   With   Without   With   Without   With   Without   With   Without   With   Without   With  
  or exogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  Endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  Endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous 
 
(Cases 2, 4, 6, 8, 
10 & 12)  regressors  Regressors  regressors  Regressors  regressors  regressors  Regressors  Regressors  regressors  regressors  regressors  regressors 
























Coef.   
Explanatory Variables                           
L.    0.451  0.557  0.404  0.571  0.255  0.375  0.244  0.357  0.197  0.316  0.155  0.324 
    (2.60)**  (4.14)**  (1.68)  (3.87)**  (1.91)  (2.46)*  (2.12)*  (2.38)*  (1.58)  (2.71)**  (1.13)  (2.19)* 
log(schooling years in  Exogenous  0.089  0.066  0.101  0.066  0.132  0.117  0.14  0.119  0.128  0.137  0.148  0.133 
 the initial years)    (1.97)*  (2.58)**  (2.03)*  (2.62)**  (4.14)**  (5.17)**  (4.76)**  (4.80)**  (3.56)**  (5.11)**  (3.89)**  (4.39)** 
log(GDP deflator)  Exogenous  0.018  0.018  0.021  0.015  -0.006  0.001  -0.006  0  -0.008  -0.011  -0.009  -0.006 
    (0.74)  (0.94)  (0.85)  (0.84)  (0.37)  (0.05)  (0.40)  (0.03)  (0.64)  (1.09)  (0.63)  (0.51) 
log(private credit/GDP)  Endogenous  -0.033  -0.023  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
    (1.91)  (1.25)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
predicted log(private credit/GDP)  Endogenous  -  -  -0.046  -0.015  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
    -  -  (1.07)  (0.63)  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
log(private credit by   Endogenous  -  -  -  -  -0.034  -0.015  -  -  -  -  -  - 
banks/GDP)    -  -  -  -  (1.33)  (0.83)  -  -  -  -  -  - 
predicted log(private credit by   Endogenous  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.044  -0.02  -  -  -  - 
banks/GDP)    -  -  -  -  -  -  (1.74)  (0.98)  -  -  -  - 
log(financial system  Endogenous  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.029  -0.016  -  - 
deposit/GDP)    -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  (3.42)**  (5.17)**  -  - 
predicted log(financial system  Endogenous  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.03  -0.02 
deposit/GDP)    -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  (2.58)**  (3.64)** 
log(Export+Import/GDP)  Endogenous  0.07  0.051  0.088  0.04  0.082  0.05  0.092  0.056  0.086  0.043  0.091  0.054 
    (1.53)  (1.59)  (1.18)  (0.99)  (0.99)  (1.06)  (1.06)  (1.12)  (1.01)  (0.99)  (0.95)  (1.16) 
Constant    2.082  1.658  2.295  1.573  2.67  2.229  2.699  2.292  2.891  2.447  3.046  2.417 
    (2.98)**  (2.95)**  (2.19)*  (2.47)*  (5.18)**  (3.90)**  (6.01)**  (4.11)**  (5.77)**  (5.58)**  (5.63)**  (4.36)** 
Observations    57  57  56  56  45  45  44  44  48  48  46  46 
Number of Country    8  8  8  8  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Arellano-Bond Tes for Serial Correlation (Z, Probb>z)                       
m 2    (1.43)  (1.45)  (1.43)  (1.44)  (0.12)  (0.04)  (-0.32)  (-0.42)  (0.46)  (0.47)  (0.04)  (-0.09) 
Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions 
Ho: overidentifying restrictions are valid                         
    chi
2(37)=   chi
2(66)=   chi
2(37)=   chi
2(65)=   chi
2(36)=   chi
2(56)=   chi
2(35)=   chi
2(55)=   chi
2(36)=   chi
2(58)=   chi
2(35)=   chi
2(57)=  
    37.61  59.88  41.83  58.07  45.04  59.35  46.9  62.75  40.53  56.31  46.28  62.25 
Prpb>Chi2     0.35  0.69  0.27  0.72  0.14  0.35  0.09  0.22  0.28  0.54  0.096  0.29 
1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% (based on robust estimators) 3. Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM one-step estimator is applied for all the cases. 
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Table 5 Results for the Undernourishment Equation based on Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimation (Dependent variable: share of 
the undernourished population in the total) 
   Whether  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6  Case 7  Case 8  Case 9  Case 10  Case 11  Case 12 
  endogenous  Without   With   Without   With   Without   With   Without   With   Without   With   Without   With  
  or exogenous  Endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  Endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous  endogenous 
 
(Cases 2, 4, 6, 8, 
10 & 12)  Regressors  regressors  regressors  Regressors  regressors  regressors  regressors  regressors  regressors  regressors  regressors  Regressors 
    Dep. 


























Variables                           
L.    0.661  0.93  0.672  0.935  1.016  0.976  1.006  0.969  0.93  0.996  0.925  0.992 
    (5.43)**  (22.02)**  (5.27)**  (22.99)**  (7.57)**  (40.15)**  (7.29)**  (40.66)**  (6.48)**  (32.06)**  (6.16)**  (29.70)** 
log(schooling 
years in  Exogenous  -0.475  0.027  -0.463  0.015  0.248  0.022  0.256  0.013  0.218  0.02  0.23  0.017 
 the initial 
years)    -0.88  -0.35  -0.83  -0.19  -1.11  -0.34  -1.08  -0.18  -1.04  -0.31  -1.09  -0.24 
log(GDP 
deflator)  Exogenous  -0.094  -0.104  -0.086  -0.099  -0.075  -0.05  -0.076  -0.053  -0.072  -0.048  -0.073  -0.044 
    -1.84  (2.83)**  (2.12)*  (2.91)**  (3.54)**  -1.77  (3.13)**  -1.67  (2.30)*  -1.81  (2.53)*  -1.48 
log(private 
credit/GDP)  Endogenous  -0.397  -0.276  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
    (4.88)**  (8.79)**  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
predicted 
log(private 
credit/GDP)  Endogenous  -  -  -0.415  -0.287  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
    -  -  (5.05)**  (6.48)**  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
log(private 
credit by   Endogenous  -  -  -  -  -0.186  -0.078  -  -  -  -  -  - 
banks/GDP)    -  -  -  -  (2.44)*  -1.01  -  -  -  -  -  - 
predicted 
log(private 
credit by   Endogenous  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.193  -0.08  -  -  -  - 
banks/GDP)    -  -  -  -  -  -  (2.57)*  -1.03  -  -  -  - 
log(financial 
system  Endogenous  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.034  -0.012  -  - 
deposit/GDP)    -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -1.02  -1.08  -  - 
predicted 
log(financial 
system  Endogenous  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.05  -0.01 
deposit/GDP)    -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -1.25  -0.37 
log(Export+Im
port/GDP)  Endogenous  0.471  -0.009  0.479  0.008  -0.106  -0.074  -0.105  -0.077  -0.179  -0.063  -0.171  -0.055 
    -1.19  -0.13  -1.18  -0.11  -1.37  -1.19  -1.35  -1.2  -1.92  -1.04  -1.61  -0.79 32 
 
log(Population 
Growth)  Exogenous  0.702  0.325  0.631  0.302  0.778  0.552  0.746  0.551  0.591  0.446  0.54  0.424 
    -0.96  -1.14  -0.91  -1.07  (4.11)**  (3.10)**  (3.98)**  (2.86)**  (2.07)*  -1.74  (2.03)*  -1.56 
log (Share of 
Working Age 
Population)  Exogenous  -0.623  -0.937  -0.593  -0.917  -1.935  -1.065  -1.887  -1.061  -1.417  -0.789  -1.372  -0.737 
    -1.4  -1.89  -1.31  -1.82  (3.71)**  (4.68)**  (3.57)**  (4.28)**  (2.34)*  (2.31)*  (2.20)*  (2.07)* 
Constant    5.748  2.198  5.489  2.151  1.9  1.678  1.804  1.706  1.738  1.377  1.544  1.323 
    -1.49  (2.34)*  -1.48  (2.31)*  (2.06)*  (2.68)**  (2.07)*  (2.51)*  -1.35  -1.63  -1.26  -1.47 
Observations    47  47  47  47  38  38  37  37  39  39  38  38 
Number of 
Code     8  8  8  8  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Arellano-Bond Tes for Serial Correlation (Z, 
Probb>z)                       
m 2    -0.37  (-0.16)  -0.55  -0.07  (-1.11)  (-1.23)  (-1.12)  (-1.21)  (-0.99)  (-1.39)  (-1.00)  (-1.44) 
Sargan Test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions                         
Ho: overidentifying 
restrictions are valid                         
    chi2(18)=   chi2(61)=   chi2(18)=   chi2(61)=   chi2(18)=   chi2(53)=   chi2(18)=   chi2(52)=   chi2(18)=   chi2(54)=   chi2(18)=   chi2(53)=  
    39.10**  83.6*  37.83**  82.65*  25.29  52.02  25.87  52.31  25.06  53.47  25.36  53.98 
Prpb>Chi2     0.003  0.03  0.004  0.03  0.12  0.51  0.103  0.46  0.12  0.49  0.12  0.44 






















Appendix 1  Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
Annual Panel Data (1960-2006) for 9 countries
Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
log(GDP pc) log of GDP per capita WDI 399 6.219 0.850 4.281 8.420
log(Agri VA pc) log of Agricultureal Value Added per capita  FAO-STAT. 388 4.772 0.478 3.779 6.044
log(private credit/GDP) log of share of domestic credit provided by WDI 339 3.446 0.839 0.651 5.349
 banking sector in GDP
*1.
log(private credit by  log of private credit by Deposit Money Banks  Beck et al. 283 -1.225 0.693 -2.645 0.507
banks/GDP) and Other Financial Institutions in GDP
*2. (2000).
log(financial system log of Financial System Deposits in GDP. Beck et al. 295 -1.382 1.479 -9.596 0.235
deposit/GDP) (2000).
log(share of population log of share of the population with education Barro-Lee 359 3.475 0.529 2.230 4.251
with primary ed. or above level of primary or above. (2000).
log(government  log of share of government espenditure in GDP. WDI 384 22.479 1.362 19.196 26.497
expenditure/GDP)
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (also referred to as prevalence of undernourishment) shows the percentage of the population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously. Data showing as 2. log of Consumer Price Index. WDI 336 3.334 1.694 -7.370 5.173
log(Ecport+Import/GDP) log of the share of Export and Import in GDP. -0.708 0.729 -2.540 0.894
*1 Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The banking sector 
includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur 
such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan institutions and building and loan associations. 
 
*2 This is similar to the first definition, but the first definition covers a broader category of banking sector, including monetary authorities, formal and informal banking institutions, while the second 










Appendix 1 - Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables (Cont.) 
log(private credit/GDP) log of share of domestic credit provided by Beck et al. 75 3.451 0.872 0.960 5.257
 banking sector in GDP. (2000).
predicted log(private credit/GDP) log of share of domestic credit provided by Beck et al. 74 3.499 0.785 1.390 5.186
 banking sector in GDP, predicted by annual panel. (2000).
log(private credit by  log of private credit by Deposit Money Banks  Beck et al. 62 -1.213 0.685 -2.437 0.374
banks/GDP) and Other Financial Institutions in GDP. (2000).
predicted log(private credit by  log of private credit by Deposit Money Banks  Beck et al. 61 -1.194 0.666 -2.347 0.345
banks/GDP) and Other Financial Institutions in GDP, predicted by annual panel. (2000).
log(financial system log of Financial System Deposits in GDP. Beck et al. 65 -1.443 1.695 -9.596 0.186
deposit/GDP) (2000).
predicetd log(financial system log of Financial System Deposits in GDP, predicted by annual panel. Beck et al. 63 -1.308 1.302 -7.809 0.175
deposit/GDP) (2000).
log(schooling years in log of average schooling years of people above 15 years old Barro-Lee 77 0.671 0.743 -0.491 1.478
 the initial year) in the initial year. (2000).
log(GDP deflator) Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate  WDI 82 1.936 1.053 -0.697 5.847
of the GDP implicit deflator. 
log(Ecport+Import/GDP) log of the share of Export and Import in GDP. WDI 82 -0.671 0.730 -2.385 0.885
log(Population Growth) log of annual popuoation growth 90 -3.920 0.358 -5.117 -3.461
log (Share of Working Age  the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or  WDI 90 -0.319 0.219 -0.892 -0.035
Population) older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64.
 
 
 